Introduction 56
Cost overruns have been and continue to be the bête noire for the public sector in Australia 57 (Love et al., 2015a; Love et al., 2017a; ; this also is a problem worldwide (Flyvbjerg et al., 58 experiencing change-orders, which can lead to cost increases being incurred (Allen Consulting 125 and the University of Melbourne, 2007) . With this in mind, it is suggested that it is misleading to 126 make direct comparisons between the base estimate at the time of the decision-to-build and 127 actual construction costs, as the estimate that is initially prepared is typically based upon a 128 conceptual design. As noted in Figure 1 , the accuracy of an estimate improves as more 129 information becomes available (e.g., scope is defined and users' requirements are identified). In 130 
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Delay tests of validity: accuracy and precision (Newton, 2012) . The inadequacies of the traditional 140 estimating process are camouflaged by the use of deterministic percentage additions that take the 141 form of a contingency, which cater for an increase in a project's cost due to: (1) variability (i.e. 142 random uncertainty); (2) risk events; and (3) unforeseeable situations (Baccarini and Love, 143 2014) . In stark contrast to the deterministic approach, it has been suggested the application of a 144 probabilistic approach to determining a construction cost contingency based upon empirical 145
analysis of a wide range of infrastructure projects should be applied (e.g. Baccarini and Love, 146 2014) . 147 148 Generally, the construction contingency percentages applied to public infrastructure projects 149 have been unable to accommodate increases in cost that are incurred. For example, Baccarini and 150
Love (2014) analysis of 228 water infrastructure projects revealed that the mean percentage 151 addition was 8.46% of their contract value, but the construction contingency requirement for the 152 final cost was 13.58%; a shortfall in contingency in the region of 5%. The magnitude of this 153 percentage addition, while evidently inaccurate, can vary with the nature of the project and the 154 type of procurement method adopted. For example, in the case of a greenfield project that is 155 being delivered via a traditional procurement method (e.g., Construct Only), the design and 156 specifications (including drawings and Bills of Quantities (BoQ)) for a project are supposed to be 157 complete at the award of a tender and thus a construction contingency between 2% and 5% is 158 often provided. As a result, there is a perception that a high degree of cost certainty will ensue, 159 but in reality this is fallacy, as complete drawings and BoQs are seldom available when a project 160 goes to tender. As previously mentioned, they invariably contain errors and omissions, which can 161 lead to change-orders and rework and increased construction costs (Love et al., 2012) . 162 to geotechnical uncertainties, contaminated soil and neighboring structures). Thus, in the case of 165
Brownfields projects, a public sector client may opt to use a non-traditional procurement route 166 (e.g. Design and Construct) and transfer the associated risks for the development to a single-167 entity as well as be provided with a Guaranteed Maximum Price, for the works. Any changes in 168 the scope of work under this form of contractual arrangement, however, will require a client to 169 pay a premium for any changes that are required. It is, therefore, necessary to have a sufficient 170 contingency allowance in place should the need for amendments arise (De Marco et al., 2015) . 171
172
Explanations for Deviations in Cost Performance 173
The literature is replete with explanations as to 'how' and 'why' the cost performance of public 174 sector infrastructure projects deviates from their expected outturn cost (e.g., Pickrell, 1992 revealed that changes in scope were the primary culprit that had contributed to cost overruns 181 occurring in their major capital projects. Next are (2) 'Psycho Strategists' who have advocated 182 that projects experience cost overruns due to deception, planning fallacy and unjustifiable 183 optimism bias in establishing the initial cost targets (Flyvbjerg et al. 2002; Siemiatycki, 2009) . 184
According to Flyvbjerg (2003) those responsible for determining the budget for an infrastructure 185 project are often subjected to applying Machiavelli's formula to ensure it is given approval to 186 proceed: costs are underestimated (-), revenues are over estimated (+), environmental impacts 187 undervalued (-) and development effects are overvalued (+) (p.43). 188
189
Often estimators/planners only consider the information that is made available to them for the 190 particular project they are involved with delivering; such a focus is referred to as having an 191 'inside view' (Flyvbjerg et al., 2005) . In particular, Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) to be adopted to adequately explain the causal nature of cost overruns. However, the research 207 presented in this paper does not seek to explain 'why', but bring to the fore 'how' cost overruns 208 occur by illustrating the direct financial consequences of poorly managed public infrastructure 209 projects. At the time a project's contract is signed, cost certainty should be affirmed, unless a 210 form of cost-plus agreement is otherwise agreed. 211
212
Illustrative Case Study 213
Most research studies that have examined the cost performance of infrastructure projects have 214 tended to rely upon heterogeneous datasets (e.g., Flyvbjerg et al., 2002; Cantarelli et al., 2012) . 215
Such datasets are loosely connected and thus there is a propensity for them to possess a 216 considerable amount of 'noise', as a morass of missing information is adequately needed to 217 explain the nature of a project's cost performance (e.g. by way of an asset owners' aims and 218 objectives, planning requirements, contractors, project teams, technologies, and contractual 219 arrangements). Instead, this research sought to obtain an ameliorated understanding of the impact 220 of change-orders on the public sector and contractors financial performance. 221
222
To illustrate how the cost performance of infrastructure projects varies and provide an insight to 223 the problem that confronts the public sector, a case study is used (Fry et al., 1999) . Typically, an 224 illustrative case study is used to describe an event; they utilize one or two instances to 225 demonstrate the reality of a situation (e.g., change-orders and margin). In this instance, the case 226 study provides a platform to demonstrate that the cost performance of public sector projects has 227 been mismanaged. The case study serves to make the 'unfamiliar, familiar', and provide a 228 common language for the nature of infrastructure projects' cost performance. 
Analysis and Findings 241
Cost data from 67 completed infrastructure projects were provided, which included their 242 procurement method, original contract value (OCV), final contract value, contractor's margin, 243 total of client approved change-orders, and final contractor's margin. Table 1 provides a  244 summary of the types and procurement methods for the 67 infrastructure projects that were 245 constructed throughout Australia within the study period (Table 1) . 'Building' (n=16, 24%) (e.g., 246
hospitals, schools and civic assets) and 'Rail' (n=16, 24%) and 'Civil' (n=22, 33%) (i.e., 247 miscellaneous works such as dam upgrades and earthworks) were the most popular types of 248 projects that were constructed. A variety of procurement methods were selected by the public 249 sector to deliver their assets (Table 1) 
Tunnel 3(7.5) 1(7.5)
Power 3(7.5) 1(7.5)
Total 44 (100) 13(100) 1(100) 1(100) 2(100) 3 (100) 3(100) 
Cost Performance 288
The value of the contracts that had been awarded by the public sector varied, though a significant 289 proportion were less than AU$100 million (n=55, 82%) as denoted in Figure 2 . The contract 290 value of the projects ranged from approximately AU$1.8 million to AU$318 million, with a 291 mean of AU$48 million (Table 2) . More specifically, 'Civil', (43%) 'Building' (25%) and 'Rail' 292 (20%) project types accounted for a majority of the contractor's turnover from 2011 to 2014 293 (Table 3) . 294 295 296
Figure 2. Number of infrastructure projects 297 298 It can be seen that the cost performance of projects ranged from -42.88% to + 270.93% of budget 299 with a mean cost overrun of 23.75% as a proportion of the OCV. This finding is in stark contrast 300 to Love (2002) who reported a mean cost overrun of 12.6% of the OCV, with 48% being 301 attributable to change-orders and the remaining 52% being due to rework. All projects that 302 utilized BIM to a minimum of LOD 300 experienced cost increases; in this instance, specific 303 model elements are demonstrated as specific assemblies accurate in terms of quantity, size, 304 shape, location and orientation. 305
A total of 67% (n=45) of projects incurred a cost overrun of less than 25% of the OCV and 9% 306 (n=6) experienced a cost underrun. A Grubbs test was used to detect outliers from a Normal 307 Distribution with the tested data being the minimum and maximum values (Grubbs, 1950) . The 308 result is a probability that belongs to the core population being examined. So, if the data is 309 approximately normally distributed, then outliers are required to have Z-scores ± 3. Outliers 310 possessing a Z-score in the range ± 2 to 3 can be considered to be 'borderline' outliers. As 311 denoted in Figure 3 , two projects were identified as being 'borderline' with Z-scores being 312 between +2 and +3 and two outright outliers being in excess of +4. Considering these Z-scores, 313 the 'best fit' distribution was determined. Considering the outliers that were present, a Normal 314
Distribution was not deemed to be the 'best fit' distribution' for the data. The 'best fit' probability distribution for 'cost performance' was examined so that probability of 322 cost deviations (i.e., underruns and overrun) could be determined at the point of contract award 323 (Love et al., 2013) ; the computation of such a distribution is both pertinent to the public sector 324 and contractors as part of formulating a risk management strategy for their projects. A caveat, 325 however, needs to be made here; the data's homogeneity would likely provide a more accurate 326 assessment of risk for the contractor, but could provide public sector clients with 'ballpark' 327 probabilities to formulate future construction contingencies. 'Underruns' and 'overruns' should 328 be separated when examining cost performance, but considering the limited number of projects 329 that were below the agreed contract value it was decided to combine them together in this case. 
348
Using the GEV PDF the probability of cost overrun of 23.75% is 73% (P=0.73). The proportion 349 of projects (67%) that experienced less than 25% cost overrun had a mean of 7.9%; the 350 probability a project exceeds its OCV is 0.58%. 351
352
The detailed financial summaries provided to the researchers by the contractor revealed that 353 client change-orders contributed to the cost deviations that were subjected to public sector 354 clients' approval. Non-conformances also materialized in the projects, but the rectification costs 355 did not impact the final contract value paid by the clients as these were the responsibility of the 356 subcontractors and suppliers. 357
358
The correlation analysis presented in Table 4 reveals that the size of a project in terms of its 359 OCV, its type, and the procurement method used were not significantly related with cost 360 performance (p <0.01). Studies examining the relationship between project size and the extent of 361 cost overrun that is incurred remains inconclusive and has been the subject of debate (e.g., 362 Odeck, 2004; Love et al., 2013 A one-way Analysis of the Variance (ANOVA) was used in this instance to test for differences. 368
Levene's test for homogeneity of variances was not found to be violated (p <0.05), which 369 indicates the population variances for project size and cost performance were equal. Thus, there 370 were no significant differences between 'project size' and cost performance, F (4,62) = 1.096, p 371 <0.05). Furthermore, to determine whether there was a difference between procurement methods 372 and cost performance, a t-test was undertaken using the categories of 'traditional' and 'non-373 traditional'. 374 375 Table 5 presents the mean and standard deviation for the cost performances for categorized 376 procurement types, and the results of the t-test are presented in Table 6 . At the 95% confidence 377 interval, no significant difference in cost performance was experienced in projects delivered 378 under the different procurement categorizations that were established. Akin with previous 379 research it can be concluded that cost performance does not significantly vary with the 380 procurement methods employed (e.g., Love, 2002) . 381 382 
Change-Orders 395
The mean amount of client approved change-orders that occurred in projects was approximately 396 AU$5.1 million (10.6%) ( Table 2 ). In addition, the total change-orders accounted for 11% of the 397 value of the work that was undertaken by the contractor between 2011 and 2014 (Table 3) . To 398 determine if there was a significant difference between the change-orders and project size an 399 ANOVA was undertaken. Levene's test for homogeneity of variances was found to be violated 400 (p = 0.00), which indicates the population variances for project size and cost performance were 401 not equal. Significant differences between change-orders and project size were found to occur, F 402 revealed that the contractor's mean margin (excluding overheads) was 9.89% of the OCV. Table  410 3 provides a breakdown of the mean margin allocated for each type of project, which ranged 411 from 8.76% to 10.61%. 412
413
The lowest record margin was 3.98% of the OCV for a 'Civil' project that had an OCV of 414 AU$48.4 million and a final contract value of AU$65.9 million. However, in this project the 415 contractor's expected margin at the commencement of the works was AU$3.8 million, but 416 declined to AU$3.2 million (-15.57%) due to issues surrounding rework, which they were 417 accountable for. This scenario was observed in several projects, for example, an AU$64.7 418 million 'Construct Only' 'Civil' project that had an expected margin of AU$2.9 million. With 419 the client issuing scope changes, the final contract value was AU$61.6 million, a cost underrun 420 of 4.06%. The contractor experienced a staggering loss of AU$38.2 million, which occurred due 421 to an array of issues that included rework, product non-conformances and delays to works (Table  422 2). Disastrous projects of this nature can, and more often than not, usually result in contractors 423 being liquidated. If, however, as in this case, they are able to shoulder such costs, then their stock 424 value, reputation and image within the public and private sectors and the general community can 425 be adversely impacted. Losses in one project can be offset against gains in others that form part 426 of a contractor's portfolio of work in progress. For example, the maximum recorded final margin 427 as noted in Table 2 was AU$80.18 million for a project that had an OCV in excess of AU$1 428 billion and incurred a cost increase of 7.5%. 429
The project that had the highest margin (> 30%) was a 'Building' project with an OCV of 430 AU$3.38 million, which increased by 25.76% in value to AU$4.87 million due to change-orders. 431
In contrast to the aforementioned example, this project's margin increased from an expected 432 value of AU$641,608 to AU$1.37 million (114.33%) . Surprisingly, the projects with margins in 433 excess of 20% of their OCV varied in size, type, and location. 
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444
Considering the prevailing 'outliers' the 'best fit' distribution was computed, and can ceteris 445 paribus be used to determine the likelihood of a contractor's margin by the public sector. The Wakeby PDF is used to determine the likelihood of a mean of 9.89% margin if applied to a 458 project; in this instance, there is a 62% (P=0.62) probability that this margin would be applied. 459
460
The mean margin OCV contract award for various sizes of projects can be seen in Table 7 . It can 461 be seen the mean margins do not significantly vary between one and another rendering the 462 Wakeby distribution identified above as a basis for determining the likely margin that would be 463 applied. Levene's test for homogeneity of variances confirms this observation as it was not found 464 to be violated (p <0.05), which indicates the population variances for project size and margin are 465
equal. Thus, there were no significant differences between 'project size' and margin, F (4,62) = 466 3.04., p <0.05). A significant association, however, was found to be present with the percentage 467 increase of the final margin with project size, r=-038, n=67, p < 0.01, two tails and cost 468 performance and r=-046, n=67, p < 0.01, two tails. It can be therefore implied that the likelihood 469 of an increase in expected margin at contract decreases with smaller OCVs. In addition, the 470 margins of a contractor increase as a project experiences larger cost overruns. 471
472
To determine whether there was a difference between procurement methods and margin, a t-test 473 was undertaken using the categories of 'traditional' and 'non-traditional'. The dominant paradigm within the public sector assumes that differing procurement options can 491 provide varying degrees of cost certainty and will influence the level of a contractor's margin, 492 which is a reflection of their risk profile; the findings presented from this illustrative case study 493 suggest the contrary, and provide a basis for the public sector to better understand the unintended 494 consequences of change-orders that can arise during the delivery of their assets. The level of a 495 contractor's margin is a small component of their cost, yet having an understanding of this 496 amount is important, as the balance of risk and reward can distort their behavior if they are not 497 aligned (Love et al., 2011) . Thus, the balance of risk and reward is dependent upon the structure 498 of the contract and how well it is managed (NAO, 2013). 499 500 Discussion 501
What matters most to the taxpayer is whether contracted out services can provide improved 502 quality at an appropriate overall cost (NAO, 2013: p.15). Taxpayers concerns, however, are not 503 being adequately addressed; evidence of this can be seen with the sheer number of public sector 504 projects that have and continue to experience cost overruns. This is not to say that the public 505 sector is neglecting such concerns; quite the contrary, as it is acknowledged that significant effort 506 has been undertaken to redress the issues that adversely impact the delivery of infrastructure 507 projects. After all public-sector employees are also taxpayers and therefore there should be a 508 resounding motivation for them to ensure assets and services are delivered, operated and 509 maintained cost effectively. However, despite noble intentions, there is a residing suspicion that 510 spending other peoples' money on other people absolves them from any form of accountability, 511 which often results in assets not providing the VfM that was initially intended. This case in point The magnitude of change-orders that occurs in projects is troublesome and hinders public sector 518 ability to cost effectively ensure the asset being delivered is 'future proofed'; that is, resilient to 519 unexpected events and adaptable to changing needs, uses or capacities. Changes during 520 construction may lead to sub-optimal solutions (e.g., design, functionality, materials, running 521 costs) being incorporated into an asset's fabric to minimize cost and meet the committed 522 completion date. 523
524
Irrespective of the procurement strategy adopted, change-orders were found to materialize during 525
construction. An analysis of the nature of change-orders is outside the remit of this paper, but it 526 was observed that changes in scope, and errors and omissions in documentation predominated. 527
Such levels of change indicate that the 'design' process has not been effectively managed, 528 irrespective of the procurement option, and the use of BIM, though as noted this was only used 529 in a limited number of projects. The authors did not have access to the construction contingency 530 of the public-sector clients, but a deterministic figure between 2% and 5% (Baccarini and Love 531 2014), which is often applied would have obviously been inadequate for the sampled projects. 532
Prior to the commencement of construction, a contingency in excess of this value would be 533 unacceptable for the public sector, as there is unequivocally a need for cost certainty. But, there 534 remains the 'elephant in the room', with no party wanting to be held accountable for contributing 535 to the development and production of an incomplete scope and poor quality tender 536 documentation. Naturally, contractors will submit a bid based upon the information that they 537 have been provided and may opportunistically price items within the BoQ where they anticipate 538 future changes to materialize to maximize their margin. 539
540
In light of the status quo, cost overruns due to change-orders will continue to prevail and could 541 even be exacerbated as there is a misconception that digitization of the design process enabled by 542 the use of BIM will reduce errors and omissions. Simply superimposing a 21 st century innovation 543 such as BIM to procurement practices where contracts do not wholly support collaborative 544 working and have been essentially developed for the 20 th century, will not leverage the benefits 545 that can be afforded from its adoption. Thus, to mitigate change-orders, behavioral, cultural, 546 legal and structural issues associated with the delivery of public sector assets need to be 547 transformed to effectively accommodate the benefits that can be afforded by BIM, especially if 548 they are to be future-proofed. The inclusion of contractors and asset managers in the design 549 process is needed to help reduce changes using visualization and enable future-proofing to take 550 place ( Figure 5 ). This can be done by ensuring the information needed to effectively operate and 551 maintain an asset is captured and provided in a usable format that is readily accessible (Figure 6 enabling the much-needed transformational change, many public-sector agencies are still 'sitting 562 on the fence' with regard to rolling out BIM and implementing the new procurement practices 563 that are required, despite being cognizant of the problems associated with existing approaches of 564 asset delivery. Indeed, this is a bold proposition, however, if the public sector is to make 565 headway in ensuring that assets are delivered cost effectively, then a charter focusing on 566 procurement reform needs to be initiated, managed and maintained; changes initiated in the past 567 have been ephemeral. 568 569 570
Conclusion 572
Public infrastructure projects that experience cost overruns adversely impact taxpayers. It is 573 therefore imperative that they are not only delivered within budget but also continue to be of 574 value into the future. Providing infrastructure that is resilient and adaptable to changing needs, 575 capacities and uses should be the ultimate goal of the public sector. The path to attaining this 576 goal can be derailed when change-orders (e.g., in scope) are required during construction, and 577 can lead to sub-optimal assets being delivered. The taxpayer pays for this additional cost, while 578 contractors are rewarded with an increase in their margins; this is the 'elephant in the room' 579 within the public sector, which is underpinned by 'spending somebody else's money on 580 somebody else'. 581
582
In examining the cost performance of public infrastructure projects an illustrative case study was 583 undertaken. Cost information from 67 projects constructed between 2011 and 2014 were 584 provided by a contracting organization. The cost overruns/underruns that were experienced were 585 calculated from the contract award to when final accounts were completed. The analysis revealed 586 that the cost performance of projects ranged from -42.88% to + 270.93%, with a mean cost 587 overrun of 23.75%. and a probability of occurring of 73%. In alignment with previous research 588 no significant differences in the magnitude of cost overruns were found to exist by a project's 589 contract value, types, and procurement method. It revealed that change-orders accounted for a 590 significant proportion of the cost overruns that emerged in the projects, with a mean of 10.6% as 591 a proportion of the original contract value. Notably, significant differences were found to occur 592
